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April 21, 2005
The Honorable Bill Frist
Senate Majority Leader
509 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Frist:
We, the undersigned professors from law schools throughout the country,
are writing to express our opposition to any effort to eliminate the
200-year old right to filibuster in the United States Senate. We are
deeply troubled by your reported plan to dismantle one of the only
protections for the minority party, drastically weaken the Senate’s
constitutionally recognized duties of advice and consent, and
rubber-stamp the President’s nominees for the federal courts. We urge
you and your colleagues to protect
the honored traditions of the Senate and strive to work toward a spirit
of bipartisanship.
The courts belong to all Americans, not just the party in power. New
appointees will help decide, among many other things, the scope of the
constitutional right to privacy -- and nominees to the Supreme Court
will help decide whether that right will continue to be recognized at
all -- whether the courts will continue to allow the federal government
to protect our air and water, and whether Americans can count on the
enforcement of laws
that protect our civil rights. Federal judges exercise an enormous
amount of power in the
lives of ordinary Americans. Further, the average tenure of federal
judges, who unlike
executive branch appointments receive lifetime terms, has steadily
risen to 24 years. This
fundamental, non-political branch of our democracy should not be at the
center of a
partisan power grab.
The Senate filibuster serves an important function in the checks and
balances system, preventing a partisan majority from running roughshod
over the minority party while promoting bipartisan compromise and
moderation. It is a particularly important check when all three
branches of government are controlled by one party. As part of the
great compromise, the framers of the Constitution designed the Senate
to be a fundamentally countermajoritarian institution. Unlike the House
of Representatives, each state is represented by two Senators,
regardless of its size. This is evidenced by the fact that the 55
Republican Senators represent 131 million Americans while the 44
Democratic Senators represent 13 million more – 144 million. Throughout
American history, the Senate, with its longer terms and rules of
unlimited debate, has acted as a deliberative body to restrain the
impulses of the House and the actions of the President. And since the
earliest days of the Republic, the right of extended debate has played
an integral part in the Senate’s historic role as restrainer – “an
effective if incalculable defense against oppression and overbearing
authority.”1
The case for unlimited debate for judicial nominations is far stronger
than with respect to other nominations or legislation. While
non-judicial appointments are intended to carry out the President’s
policies, judges constitute an independent third branch, designed to
keep Congress and the executive within constitutional bounds. It is a
fundamental and indispensable element of our checks and balances system
that judges should not be partial to anyone. Further, the fact that
federal judges have life-tenure and can exercise great power,
accountable to no one, for several decades, makes protecting the Senate
minority’s right of extended debate on judicial nominations especially
vital. The Senate’s decision to confirm is practically irreversible,
even when new information casts serious doubt on a judge’s fitness to
serve. Such irreversibility and longevity are not true of either
non-judicial nominations or legislation
To check the appointment powers of the President, the United States
Constitution assigns the Senate a critical co-equal role in the
judicial appointment process. This role is mandated by the founding
fathers, and is supported by history, documented by constitutional
scholars, and recognized by Republicans. As Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution states, “[The President of the United States] shall
nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the
Supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States.” The framers, fresh with
memories of the abuses of King George III, intentionally designed a
system that divided the appointment power
between the Senate and the President. Republican Senator Strom
Thurmond, in opposing
the nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice in 1968, explained the
Senate’s co-equal
role as follows:
It is my opinion, further, that if the Senate will turn down this
nomination, we
will thus indicate to the President and future Presidents that we
recognize our
responsibility as Senators. After all, this is a dual responsibility.
The President
merely picks or selects or chooses the individual for a position of
this kind, and
the Senate has the responsibility of probing into his character and
integrity, and
into his philosophy, and determining whether or not he is a properly
qualified
person to fill the particular position under consideration at the time.2
The founding fathers included the “advice and consent” clause not as a
rubber stamp, but
with the intention that rejection of nominees was a very real
possibility. This possibility
has been recognized by Senators of both parties. For example, former
Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch commented that “conducting a fair
confirmation
process most assuredly does not mean granting the president carte
blanche in filling the
federal judiciary.”3
Senators of all political persuasions have used their
constitutionally-prescribed
“advice and consent” authority to reject judicial nominees. Between
1789 and 1900, 20
of 85 Supreme Court nominees did not make it to the bench – they were
rejected,
withdrawn or not acted upon. Delaying action and filibusters on federal
court nominees
has precedent in more recent history as well. Republicans blocked over
60 of President
Clinton’s nominees – often with a single senator, rather than the
substantial minority of
41 Senators that a successful filibuster requires. Senate Republicans
also have expressly
acknowledged their right to filibuster judicial nominations. During a
2000 filibuster of
two of President Clinton’s nominees, Republican Senator Robert Smith of
New
Hampshire declared, “Don’t . . . tell me that somehow I am violating
the Constitution of
the United States of America by blocking a judge or filibustering a
judge I don’t think
deserves to be on the court. That is my responsibility. That is my
advice and consent
role, and I intend to exercise it.”4
In the past, presidents have honored the Senate’s “advice” role by
consulting even
Senators of the opposing party on judicial nominations. For example,
when the
Republican Party took control of the Senate in 1995, President Clinton
consulted Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch in advance of any nomination,
and withdrew
nominations opposed by Republican Senators, despite criticism from his
own party. In
addition, Senator Hatch has written that even though he belonged to the
minority party in
1993-94, President Clinton consulted with him to nominate Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer for the Supreme Court. The Bush Administration has
flatly refused to
engage in any such consultation.
Despite current assertions to the contrary, there is no legal basis for
the suggestion
that the use of filibusters in judicial nominations is
unconstitutional. The Constitution
does not say that a simple majority vote is required for Senate
confirmation of a nominee,
and it does not guarantee a vote on any nominee. Rather, Article I,
Section 5 of the
Constitution authorizes the Senate to determine its own rules of
procedure, and Senate
Rule XXII requires 60 votes to end debate on legislation or
nominations. This tradition
of requiring a super-majority to end debate reaches back to our
nation’s earliest days.
The idea that the majority party can unilaterally change the rules in
the “middle of the
game” is undemocratic. Further, if filibustering judicial nominees is
unconstitutional, so
are other common Senate practices used to protect the rights of
individual Senators, such
as the blue slip process and senatorial “holds.” Republicans, who used
these practices
profligately during the Clinton Administration, are not making that
argument.
Elimination of the filibuster in regard to judicial nominations, dubbed
the “nuclear
option,” would overturn the Senate’s 200 year check on recklessness and
would have
disastrous consequences for our democracy. As former Republican Senate
Majority
Leader Howard Baker wrote in 1993, destroying the right to filibuster,
“would topple one
of the pillars of American Democracy: the protection of minority rights
from majority
rule. The Senate is the only body in the federal government where these
minority rights
are fully and specifically protected. It was designed for that purpose
by America’s
Founders, who saw it, in Jefferson’s words, ‘as a saucer into which the
nation’s passions
may be poured to cool.’”5
Over the past several years, there have already been significant
damages to the
rights of the Senate minority and individual Senators. For example, in
2003-04, Senator
Hatch unilaterally changed several Judiciary Committee rules that had
protected the
minority, dropping the blue slip requirement, the requirement that at
least one member of
the minority party agree to vote on a nominee if any Senator on the
Committee objected
to holding a vote, and the “Strom Thurmond rule,” which prevented the
Senate from
considering judicial nominees after the presidential nominating
conventions. Such
changes have led to an environment where the majority party has little
incentive to
compromise and has left the minority with no means beyond the
filibuster to protect their
sacred advice and consent duty.
Invoking the nuclear option would also set a dangerous precedent. The
Constitution is equally silent regarding the legitimacy of
supermajorities to end debate on legislation and judicial nominations.
Therefore, the same arguments being used today to try to end
filibusters on judicial nominees can be used tomorrow to end
filibusters on legislation.
We believe that filibusters on judicial nominations have been employed
judiciously and appropriately. During President Bush’s first term, the
Senate confirmed 204 of his nominees, blocking only 10 of the most
radical, out of the mainstream picks.
In fact, President Bush has now appointed 24% of all active federal
judges, including
20% of all circuit judges. Further, despite claims to the contrary, the
federal judiciary
does not have a vacancy crisis. There are currently 43 vacancies in the
federal
judiciary—much lower than the 100-plus vacancies that often existed
during the Clinton
Administration.
We urge you to reaffirm the Senate’s constitutional role in the
judicial selection process and strongly oppose any efforts to eliminate
the Senators’ right to filibuster. It is important to remember that the
pendulum swings, and that the majority today will one
day be the minority. Rather than creating chaos in the Senate and
destroying the Senate’s
honored traditions, there is a clear solution to ending delays on
nominations: consultation.
President Bush must stop trying to pack the courts with extremist
nominees and take
seriously the “advice” portion of the advice and consent clause by
consulting with Senators from both parties to select moderate,
consensus candidates. History proves that
consultation produces an excellent federal judiciary. We urge you to
strive to retain the
crucial role the Senate plays in selecting our nation’s federal judges.
Signed,
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